As America approaches the 25th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, one of the more striking changes in our politics is not what happened on that terrible morning, but what has happened to the politics surrounding it. On the September 9, 2026 edition of MSNOW’s All In with Chris Hayes, Hayes examined what he portrayed as a remarkable Republican metamorphosis: ideas once treated on the right as career-ending “9/11 truther” conspiracies are now being entertained publicly by prominent Republicans. The episode itself advertised a report on “the 9/11 truther sitting in the United States Senate,” making the contrast between then and now the centerpiece of the segment.
#BREAKING: On the 25th anniversary of 9/11, Chris Hayes highlighted a stunning Republican metamorphosis: “truther” conspiracies were once so politically radioactive that Glenn Beck helped drive Van Jones from Obama’s White House merely over his name appearing on a 9/11… pic.twitter.com/IUUWGxwvDu
The most illuminating historical example is Van Jones. In 2009, Jones was serving in the Obama administration as a special adviser on green jobs when conservative media—most prominently Glenn Beck—hammered him over his name appearing on a 2004 petition associated with the 9/11 Truth movement. Beck went considerably further, claiming Jones believed the Bush administration had “blew up the World Trade Center and covered it up.” PolitiFact later rated that characterization only Half True: Jones’s name did appear on the petition, but the document called for further investigation and raised questions about whether officials might have allowed the attacks to happen; it did not say Bush officials blew up the towers. Jones repudiated the petition’s implications, saying they did not represent his views, and his name was subsequently removed. The controversy was not the only issue dogging Jones—his past political activism and other inflammatory remarks were also under fire—but amid that broader conservative campaign, he resigned from the White House.
That history makes Sen. Ron Johnson’s more recent rhetoric remarkable. In April 2025, the Wisconsin Republican discussed 9/11 on a podcast, questioned the accepted explanation for the collapse of World Trade Center Building 7, suggested it may have been a “controlled demolition,” and spoke of pursuing Senate hearings. Johnson, who chaired the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, also suggested that the government knew more about 9/11 than it had disclosed. These are not fringe comments from an anonymous internet poster; they came from a sitting United States senator with investigative authority. Yet Johnson did not experience anything resembling the immediate political exile that association with the “truther” movement could produce in the post-9/11 political era.
There is an important qualification to Hayes’s comparison. The Van Jones controversy cannot fairly be reduced to only 9/11: conservatives were simultaneously attacking his previous radical politics and controversial remarks, and Jones’s precise connection to the petition was disputed. Likewise, Johnson says he is asking questions and seeking evidence, rather than simply adopting every claim associated with the sprawling 9/11 Truth movement. And questioning government findings is not inherently illegitimate. But the political contrast remains difficult to miss. In 2009, merely being linked to a petition that raised conspiratorial questions about 9/11 helped make a White House official politically radioactive. Sixteen years later, a Republican senator could himself publicly raise one of the movement’s signature theories—controlled demolition of Building 7—and contemplate congressional investigation.
That may be the most fascinating takeaway from Hayes’s segment as September 11, 2026 approaches. The underlying evidence about the attacks has not undergone some comparable revolution; the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s investigation concluded that uncontrolled fires caused the progressive collapse of Building 7, not explosives. What has unmistakably changed is the political ecosystem in which conspiratorial claims circulate. Glenn Beck once wielded the “truther” label as a devastating indictment against Van Jones. Today, Ron Johnson can venture into territory once considered politically toxic and remain a powerful senator. Twenty-five years after 9/11, perhaps the story is not simply that conspiracy theories survived. It is that the political price for entertaining them has changed dramatically—and, depending on who is doing the entertaining, may barely exist at all.
In reference to my previous post on the Hope Florida money trail, there is one defense from Florida officials that deserves a closer examination because, on its face, it sounds compelling: if the Hope Florida affair really involved fraud, corruption or the misuse of taxpayer money, why didn’t the grand jury indict anyone? In that earlier piece, I traced how $10 million connected to Florida’s $67 million Medicaid settlement with Centene went to the Hope Florida Foundation—the charitable arm associated with First Lady Casey DeSantis’ signature initiative—then through two nonprofits and ultimately into political organizations advancing Gov. Ron DeSantis’ agenda. I also raised the question of whether Vice President JD Vance’s highly publicized anti-fraud crusade would be applied with the same intensity when allegations involving public health-care money lead into the political orbit of a powerful Republican governor. But the absence of indictments presents a separate question, and former Republican congressman and Democratic gubernatorial nominee David Jolly offered an important answer during an appearance with Jen Psaki on MSNOW: you cannot fairly evaluate the lack of indictments without examining why the grand jury said it was unable to indict anyone. The jury did not investigate the transaction and conclude that nothing improper happened. According to the leaked report, it concluded that $10 million in taxpayer money had been “misappropriated,” called the diversion part of a “sophisticated scheme to fund political activities,” and nevertheless found insufficient evidence to charge a particular person criminally because investigators could not establish who made the critical decision to send the money to Hope Florida.
#BREAKING: Psaki: “This completely crazy level of corruption is happening in a state you are hoping to lead. What do you think is most important for people just tuning into the story, trying to digest it, to really understand?”
That distinction changes the entire meaning of the “no indictments” defense. There is an enormous difference between a grand jury saying, we examined what happened and found no wrongdoing, and a grand jury saying, we found wrongdoing but cannot establish which individual can be criminally charged for it. The latter is much closer to what the Hope Florida report says. The grand jury concluded that the entire Centene settlement represented taxpayer reimbursement and rejected the characterization that the disputed $10 million was simply some extra “bonus” that could be directed elsewhere. It identified the decision to send that money to Hope Florida as the original misappropriation. But when jurors attempted to determine who actually made that decision, they encountered a remarkable problem: according to the report, “Nobody will take responsibility” for deciding that the $10 million would go to Hope Florida, and witnesses either could not identify or did not remember who made the decision. The jury therefore found itself in the unusual position of saying it could see that taxpayer money had been misused for political purposes while being unable to establish who, individually, could be prosecuted for causing it to happen.
That is not a minor technical distinction. Criminal prosecution requires prosecutors to do more than demonstrate that something improper happened. They must connect specific conduct to specific defendants and establish the elements of a particular criminal offense. Depending on the alleged crime, that can require evidence showing who authorized an action, what that person knew, whether there was criminal intent and what role that individual played. Investigators can therefore trace money from point A through points B, C and D, establish that its ultimate disposition was improper, and still find themselves unable to prosecute if they cannot prove who ordered the crucial first step. That appears to be the fundamental problem the Hope Florida grand jury encountered. The jury’s inability to identify who made the original decision is therefore not evidence that the decision was proper. In fact, the grand jury expressly reached the opposite conclusion about the money itself. As the report put it, despite finding that the money was misappropriated, jurors found “insufficient evidence to charge anyone criminally.”
The circumstances that produced that evidentiary gap are precisely what make Jolly’s argument so significant. According to the grand jury, virtually everyone involved was a lawyer, and many witnesses said they were acting based upon the advice of other lawyers. Jurors explicitly recognized that this created an impediment to criminal prosecution. Yet the jury still concluded that it could “plainly see” taxpayer money had been misused for political purposes. That is a remarkable statement. It essentially means the grand jury believed it could identify the improper disposition of the money but could not penetrate the decision-making structure sufficiently to assign prosecutable responsibility to an individual. Rather than resolving the scandal, the absence of charges therefore leaves perhaps its most important question unanswered: Who decided that $10 million belonging to Florida taxpayers should be sent to Hope Florida in the first place?
That question becomes even more consequential when considering who reportedly never testified before the grand jury. Gov. DeSantis was not called. Then-Attorney General Ashley Moody, now a U.S. senator, was not called. James Uthmeier, who was DeSantis’ chief of staff at the time and is now Florida’s attorney general, was not called either. Yet the report concluded that Uthmeier was “in a position of authority” over officials involved in settling with Centene, and testimony identified him as having involvement in directing the money after it reached Hope Florida. His Keep Florida Clean political committee ultimately became the principal recipient of most of the disputed $10 million. The grand jury also concluded that Moody knew about the diversion plan and authorized her chief deputy to sign the settlement, although Moody says her office had no knowledge of how Hope Florida or subsequent recipients would ultimately spend the money. None of these facts establishes criminal guilt by DeSantis, Moody, Uthmeier or anyone else. But when the central reason for not bringing charges is the inability to establish who made the critical decision, the fact that several of the highest-ranking officials connected to the episode never testified is hardly irrelevant.
This is where the claim that the grand jury “cleared” everyone becomes particularly difficult to sustain. Imagine how different the situation would be if the grand jury had heard sworn testimony from every major participant, obtained all relevant communications and records, established who made the decision to direct the $10 million to Hope Florida, reconstructed what everyone knew at the time, determined whether anyone anticipated its subsequent political use, and then concluded that no crime had occurred. Such a finding would represent powerful evidence in favor of DeSantis and the officials involved. Critics would have to reckon seriously with it. But that is not what happened according to the report. Instead, investigators were left with a central decision for which nobody would accept responsibility and witnesses could not—or would not—identify a decision-maker. To take the resulting absence of charges and transform it into proof that nothing improper occurred is to omit the very reason the grand jury gave for its inability to bring charges.
Jolly’s argument goes further. Speaking with Psaki, he described a situation in which some of the officials connected to the controversy subsequently rose into even more powerful positions in Florida and federal government. Moody, who was attorney general when the settlement was approved, was later appointed by DeSantis to the United States Senate. Uthmeier moved from DeSantis’ chief of staff to attorney general. John Guard, Moody’s chief deputy, who signed the settlement despite concerns described in the grand jury report about the arrangement’s compliance with Florida law, was subsequently appointed by DeSantis to the Second District Court of Appeal. Those appointments do not prove bribery, a quid pro quo or a criminal conspiracy, and they should not be presented as if they do. But they add to the institutional problem: people connected to the underlying events have subsequently occupied some of the very positions from which Floridians might ordinarily expect governmental accountability. That is one reason Jolly says the investigation should be reopened and additional facts pursued.
And that is why independence matters so much. The issue is not that the existing grand jurors themselves should be presumed partisan, compromised or corrupt. There is no basis for making such an accusation. The issue is whether a new investigation, conducted by an independent special counsel or similarly insulated authority with the ability to pursue the unanswered questions, could reach a much more definitive conclusion. Such an investigation could seek testimony from the central officials who did not appear before the grand jury, obtain relevant communications and records, reconstruct the decision-making process surrounding the Centene settlement, determine who authorized the $10 million transfer, establish what state officials knew about its intended destination, and examine whether its subsequent movement into political organizations was anticipated or coordinated. The objective should not be to find a way to prosecute DeSantis or anyone else. It should be to obtain the answers that the first investigation was unable to obtain.
That point is important because a truly independent investigation could just as easily vindicate the officials involved. Suppose an independent special counsel obtained testimony from every central figure, established exactly who authorized the transfer and why, examined communications surrounding the settlement, followed the subsequent movement of the money, tested every legal argument offered by the administration and ultimately concluded that no individual committed a crime. That would be a substantially different—and far more powerful—finding than the one Florida has today. It would mean investigators knew who made the decisions, understood why they were made, possessed the relevant evidence and nevertheless determined that criminal prosecution was unwarranted. If an independent investigation produced that conclusion, it should carry enormous weight. The existing grand jury report cannot provide the same vindication precisely because it says the jury could not determine who made the crucial decision. The unanswered question is not incidental to its failure to indict; it is central to it.
The grand jury’s recommendations make the claim of complete exoneration even harder to reconcile with what jurors actually found. The jury recommended that Florida lawmakers establish clearer requirements governing money received by the state and impose tracking, monitoring and consequences governing how state-affiliated entities such as Hope Florida may use taxpayer dollars. That is significant. A grand jury persuaded that the entire controversy was imaginary would have little reason to recommend laws designed to prevent something similar from happening again. Instead, the jurors concluded taxpayer money had been misappropriated, said they could plainly see that it had been misused for political purposes, and then urged the Legislature to create safeguards against a recurrence. Those are the findings of a grand jury frustrated by the limits of its ability to assign criminal responsibility, not the findings of one announcing that everything was aboveboard.
DeSantis, Uthmeier, Moody and the other officials involved are nevertheless entitled to have their defenses presented fairly. DeSantis strongly disputes the grand jury’s characterization of the $10 million, saying there was “no diversion of any Medicaid funds” and describing the money as a private contribution connected to a legally sound settlement. Uthmeier calls the controversy a politically motivated witch hunt and says nobody did anything wrong. Moody says her office was only one of several agencies involved in the settlement and had no knowledge of how Hope Florida or other organizations would subsequently spend the money. Those are not arguments that should simply be brushed aside because critics distrust the officials making them. They should be tested against evidence. If the $10 million really was a private contribution rather than money owed to Florida taxpayers, establish that conclusively. If state officials properly possessed the legal authority to structure the settlement this way, demonstrate it. If the subsequent political spending was entirely disconnected from the people responsible for directing the money to Hope Florida, establish that through testimony and records. An independent investigation could ultimately substantiate those defenses.
But “nobody was indicted” cannot substitute for those answers. Attorney General Uthmeier himself had emphasized the absence of an indictment even before the report became public, saying that he had not been indicted, had not been a suspect or target and had not engaged in criminal activity. After the report emerged, he again emphasized that there was not even probable cause to proceed. Yet the grand jury’s findings complicate that argument enormously. The relevant question is not merely whether an indictment emerged at the end of the process. It is whether investigators possessed sufficient evidence to identify and prove who was responsible for conduct the grand jury itself considered improper. According to the report, they did not—and the report tells us why.
This is ultimately why Jolly’s call to reopen the investigation deserves serious consideration regardless of one’s political affiliation. Indeed, Jolly has challenged his Republican opponent for governor, Byron Donalds, to commit to doing the same. The principle should be straightforward: if public money was handled properly, an independent investigation should be capable of demonstrating that. If laws were broken, an independent investigation should identify who broke them. And if something improper occurred but falls short of criminal conduct, Floridians should still know exactly what happened and who made the decisions. Accountability is not limited to criminal indictments. Misuse of public money can raise questions of ethics, governance, statutory compliance and public trust even when prosecutors cannot prove a crime against a particular individual.
The most important question surrounding Hope Florida therefore is not simply, “Where are the indictments?” It is, “Why weren’t there indictments?” If the answer were that investigators established every important fact and found no wrongdoing, the administration would have an exceptionally strong defense. But the grand jury itself supplied a very different explanation: it found the money had been misappropriated, found that taxpayer money had been used for political purposes, could not determine who made the original decision to send it to Hope Florida, encountered witnesses who would not accept responsibility or could not remember who had done so, and recognized those evidentiary problems as an impediment to criminal prosecution. The absence of an indictment under those circumstances is a failure to establish individual criminal liability. It is not the same thing as a finding that nothing improper happened.
There is therefore a straightforward way to settle the competing narratives. Put the matter before investigative authority sufficiently independent from the people and institutions implicated in the controversy. Obtain testimony from the central decision-makers. Examine the communications and financial records. Determine who authorized the transfer. Establish what that person believed the money represented and why it was directed to Hope Florida. Determine what officials knew about its subsequent disposition. Test the administration’s legal explanation against the grand jury’s conclusion that the entire $67 million represented taxpayer reimbursement. Follow the evidence without regard to whether the result helps Democrats or Republicans. If that investigation ultimately concludes that no crime occurred, DeSantis and his allies would have something far more persuasive than the talking point they have today: a complete, independent investigation that answered the outstanding questions and cleared them.
Until then, the Hope Florida grand jury’s failure to indict should not be mistaken for vindication. In some respects, the reasons it gave for not indicting are among the strongest arguments for continuing the investigation. A grand jury concluded that $10 million belonging to taxpayers was misappropriated and ultimately used for political purposes, yet it could not establish who was criminally responsible because nobody would take responsibility for the crucial decision that put the money on that path. That finding demands caution about accusing any individual of a crime, but it also demands something more than a declaration that the case is closed. If a genuinely independent investigation hears from the principal players, obtains the missing evidence, answers the unanswered questions and still concludes that no charges are warranted, that would be meaningful vindication. Florida does not have that finding today. What it has is an unresolved question sitting at the center of $10 million in taxpayer money: who made the decision, and why? Until somebody can answer it, “no indictments” should not be the end of the Hope Florida story. It should be the beginning of the demand for an independent accounting.
When Anna Paulina Luna publicly signals a hearing tied to something as controversial and historically unsettling as Project MKUltra, it’s bound to turn heads—and not just because of the subject matter, but because of the willingness it takes to even go there. For decades, MKUltra has occupied a strange space in American consciousness: partially declassified fact, partially dismissed suspicion, and fully uncomfortable. Many elected officials would rather steer clear of it altogether, treating it as politically radioactive. That’s precisely why Luna’s move stands out. It suggests a readiness to engage with topics that others avoid, not because they lack relevance, but because they carry reputational risk.
There’s a broader context here that makes this moment particularly notable. Across the country, there’s a growing appetite for transparency—whether it’s about government surveillance, intelligence practices, or long-buried programs that were once waved away as conspiracy. From renewed scrutiny of agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency to bipartisan calls for declassification in other areas, the public mood has shifted. People are less willing to accept “trust us” as a sufficient answer, especially when it comes to historical abuses of power. In that sense, this hearing isn’t just about MKUltra itself; it fits into a larger pattern of reevaluating what has been hidden and why.
What makes Luna’s approach noteworthy is not necessarily that she’s promising explosive revelations—there’s no indication that May 13 will suddenly rewrite the historical record—but that she’s legitimizing the conversation within a formal government setting. That alone matters. When something moves from the fringes into a congressional hearing room, it changes how it’s perceived. It becomes something that can be questioned, documented, and entered into the public record, rather than dismissed outright.
For a subset of Americans often referred to as “targeted individuals,” this development will likely carry particular significance. Many in that community have long argued that programs resembling MKUltra never truly ended, but instead evolved under different classifications and technologies. Their claims are controversial and widely disputed, but they persist in part because of the historical reality that MKUltra itself was once denied before being partially confirmed. A hearing like this, even if it doesn’t validate those beliefs, signals that the door to inquiry is not completely shut—and that alone can feel like a shift.
At the same time, expectations should remain grounded. It’s unlikely that May 13 will produce a major bombshell or definitive answers to decades-old questions. Government hearings, especially on sensitive intelligence matters, tend to move incrementally rather than dramatically. But that doesn’t make them meaningless. In many cases, the first hearing is less about revelation and more about establishing that the topic deserves attention at all.
If anything, this could serve as a starting point—a signal that even the most uncomfortable chapters of government history are not off-limits forever. And if that leads to more hearings, more documents, and more scrutiny over time, then it will have achieved something meaningful. Because in a climate increasingly defined by demands for openness, even small steps toward transparency matter. As the saying goes, sunshine is the best disinfectant.
The news that 42 House Democrats voted to reauthorize surveillance powers under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is almost guaranteed to land poorly with a sizable portion of the party’s grassroots. For activists who have spent years warning about civil liberties, executive overreach, and the potential for abuse—especially under polarizing figures like Donald Trump—this kind of vote feels less like a technical policy decision and more like a betrayal of core principles. It cuts directly against a narrative that Democrats often use to distinguish themselves: that they are the party more skeptical of unchecked surveillance power and more protective of individual rights. When that expectation collides with reality, frustration tends to spill out quickly and loudly.
That frustration is likely to be amplified online, where simplified interpretations take hold fast. The idea that “if all Democrats had voted no, the measure would have failed” creates a clean, emotionally resonant storyline—one where a unified opposition could have stopped something unpopular, but didn’t. That gap between what could have happened and what did happen becomes fertile ground for accusations of hypocrisy or complicity. It also feeds directly into the long-running “uniparty” critique—the belief that, despite rhetorical differences, both major parties ultimately converge on key issues like national security and surveillance when it matters most. For critics who already suspect that partisan divides are overstated, this vote becomes exhibit A.
At the same time, the motivations behind those 42 votes are likely far more complicated than the online backlash suggests. Members of Congress don’t operate in a vacuum; they represent districts with very different political compositions and priorities. For Democrats in competitive or purple districts—places where elections are decided on the margins—national security votes can carry particular weight. A “no” vote on surveillance authorities can be framed by opponents as being weak on security, even if that framing oversimplifies the policy. In tightly contested races, that kind of vulnerability can be decisive, and lawmakers know it.
There’s also the institutional pressure that comes with governing. Intelligence agencies, leadership figures, and bipartisan committees often emphasize the importance of maintaining surveillance capabilities, arguing that they are essential tools for counterterrorism and foreign intelligence. Lawmakers who sit on relevant committees or receive classified briefings may come away with a different sense of urgency than the public sees. Even if they have reservations about privacy implications, they may weigh those concerns against what they are told are real-world risks. In that context, a vote to reauthorize isn’t always an endorsement of the status quo—it can be a reluctant calculation shaped by information that isn’t fully visible to voters.
Political incentives inside Congress also play a role. Party leadership sometimes encourages members to support certain measures to maintain negotiating leverage or to secure concessions elsewhere. For newer members or those seeking committee assignments or leadership favor, breaking with the party line—or with a bipartisan consensus—can carry costs. Even in a party that often emphasizes ideological cohesion, there are layers of strategic decision-making that complicate what might otherwise look like a straightforward vote.
None of that is likely to fully satisfy grassroots critics, though. From their perspective, the broader pattern matters more than the internal reasoning. Each vote like this reinforces a sense that campaign rhetoric about protecting civil liberties doesn’t always translate into legislative action. Over time, that perception can erode trust, dampen enthusiasm, and create tension between the party’s base and its elected officials. It also gives political opponents—and internal critics—an easy talking point: that when it comes to certain core powers of government, the differences between the parties narrow considerably.
What emerges, then, is a familiar dynamic in American politics: elected officials navigating complex, often conflicting pressures, while voters—especially highly engaged ones—demand clearer adherence to stated principles. The gap between those two realities doesn’t just produce moments of backlash like this one; it shapes the broader narrative about what each party stands for, and whether those distinctions hold up when the stakes are highest.
Before leaning too hard into that claim, it’s worth noting that there isn’t any confirmed public record of a U.S. “$25 billion in 30 days” war with Iran or an official Pentagon acknowledgment of such a figure. Numbers like that circulate on social media and can be misleading or pulled from broader defense spending categories. That said, using the $25 billion figure as a hypothetical is still a useful way to understand tradeoffs in federal spending priorities.
🇺🇸🚨 NEW: A top Pentagon official just testified that the United States has spent $25 billion on the Iran war.
In 30 days.
$25 billion.
Trump said daycare is “not possible.” Medicare is “not possible.”
Medicaid for 72 million Americans is “not possible.”
If $25 billion were spent in a single month and continued for several months, the scale becomes enormous very quickly. At that pace, you’re looking at $75 billion over three months or $150 billion over six. That’s not abstract money—it’s comparable to or larger than the annual budgets of entire domestic programs that affect tens of millions of people.
To put that into perspective, $25 billion could fund a substantial expansion of Medicaid coverage, the joint federal-state program that already covers around 70+ million Americans. Estimates vary by state, but on average, a few thousand dollars per enrollee per year can provide basic coverage. That means tens of billions could extend coverage to millions more people or significantly improve reimbursement rates for providers, making care more accessible in underserved areas. Instead of emergency rooms absorbing uncompensated care, you’d have a more stable, preventative system that lowers long-term costs.
Childcare is another area where that level of funding would be transformative. One of the biggest barriers for working families is the cost of daycare, which in many parts of the country rivals rent or even college tuition. A $25 billion investment could dramatically expand subsidies, cap costs as a percentage of income, or fund universal pre-K programs across multiple states. Even spreading that money over a few months could stabilize childcare providers, raise wages for workers in the sector, and make it possible for millions of parents to re-enter or stay in the workforce.
Then there’s nutrition assistance. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP, is one of the most efficient anti-poverty programs in the U.S., with administrative costs that are relatively low compared to its impact. Tens of billions of dollars could increase benefit levels, expand eligibility, or ensure consistent access during economic downturns. A temporary $25 billion boost alone could significantly raise monthly benefits for millions of households, directly reducing food insecurity almost overnight.
If that $25 billion monthly pace continued, the cumulative effect becomes even more striking. Three months of that spending—$75 billion—could fund a nationwide childcare affordability initiative and still leave room to expand healthcare access. Six months—$150 billion—could reshape multiple systems at once: stabilizing Medicaid, making childcare broadly affordable, and strengthening food assistance in a way that meaningfully reduces poverty.
The broader point isn’t that defense spending and domestic programs are interchangeable line items; they operate under different political and strategic frameworks. But the comparison highlights how quickly resources can be mobilized when something is treated as urgent. When similar urgency is applied to domestic issues like healthcare, childcare, or food security, the scale of what’s possible looks very different.
Framing it this way makes the tradeoffs clearer. It’s not just about whether a number like $25 billion is large—it’s about what that same amount of money represents in everyday terms: doctor visits people can afford, childcare slots parents can rely on, and groceries families don’t have to skip.
The report from The New York Times lands like an accusation, not a curiosity: that the Supreme Court of the United States has not just drifted into new procedural territory, but deliberately engineered a quieter, faster, and less transparent way to wield its power. If the justices knowingly chose to bypass long-standing norms to expand the use of the “shadow docket,” then this isn’t a minor procedural evolution—it’s a fundamental shift in how the nation’s highest court operates, with real consequences for how its decisions are understood and trusted.
Secret memos by Supreme Court justices, obtained by The New York Times, show how they decided to bypass time-tested procedures and create the modern “shadow docket,” a controversial new way of doing business. https://t.co/xNu6GXxmdl
To understand why this lands the way it does, you have to grasp what the “shadow docket” actually is. Historically, it wasn’t controversial at all. It referred to routine, often administrative decisions—things like scheduling, brief extensions, or emergency stays in extreme circumstances. These decisions were typically fast, procedural, and not meant to set sweeping precedent. For decades, they were used sparingly and mostly in situations where time was critical, like imminent executions or urgent injunctions.
What’s changed—and what the Times story is getting at—is not the existence of the shadow docket, but its evolution. Over the past several years, especially since the late 2010s, the Court has increasingly used this fast-track mechanism to decide major, politically charged issues: immigration policy, abortion restrictions, environmental rules, executive power. And it often does so without full briefing, oral arguments, or detailed written opinions.
That’s where the perception problem starts. In the traditional “merits docket,” cases unfold slowly and publicly. Lawyers argue. Justices ask questions. Opinions are written and scrutinized. Even people who disagree with the outcome can at least see the reasoning. The shadow docket, by contrast, can feel abrupt and opaque—decisions appear, sometimes late at night, unsigned, with minimal explanation. That lack of transparency is what critics say undermines legitimacy, not just the outcomes themselves.
Now, the reporting adds a new layer: intent. If internal memos show that justices were aware they were breaking from “time-tested procedures” and did so deliberately, it reframes the shift from something organic or reactive into something strategic. A 2016 case involving federal environmental regulation is often cited as a turning point—an instance where the Court intervened early and unusually, effectively laying the groundwork for the modern use of the shadow docket.
But calling this entirely unprecedented would be overstating it. The Court has always had emergency powers, and it has occasionally used them in high-stakes ways before. The difference today is scale, frequency, and subject matter. What used to be rare is now relatively common, and what used to be technical is now often deeply political. That shift is why even some judges and legal scholars say the current moment feels different, not just in degree but in kind.
Supporters of the Court’s approach push back on the idea that this is some kind of procedural coup. They argue that the judiciary needs flexibility to act quickly, especially when lower courts issue nationwide injunctions that can halt federal policy instantly. From that perspective, the shadow docket is less about secrecy and more about necessity—an efficient tool in a system where legal conflicts move faster than ever. Some justices have even criticized the term “shadow docket” itself as misleading and politically charged.
Still, perception matters, and this is where the political dimension becomes unavoidable. The current Court’s conservative majority has been the primary user of this expanded shadow docket, and many of the outcomes have aligned with conservative legal priorities. That doesn’t automatically make the decisions illegitimate, but it does make the optics harder to separate from ideology. When major policy questions are resolved quickly, quietly, and in ways that track partisan expectations, it reinforces the belief—fair or not—that the Court is acting as a political body.
Recent criticism from within the Court itself underscores how serious this concern has become. Ketanji Brown Jackson has warned that heavy reliance on emergency rulings risks eroding transparency and weakening the authority of lower courts, describing the trend as potentially corrosive. That kind of internal dissent doesn’t just stay within legal circles—it spills into public discourse and shapes how ordinary people interpret what the Court is doing.
So when a widely read outlet like The New York Times publishes a story framed around “secret memos” and procedural bypassing, it amplifies an already fragile dynamic. For critics, it confirms suspicions that the Court is consolidating power in less visible ways. For defenders, it likely looks like another attempt to delegitimize a conservative judiciary by framing routine internal deliberations as something more sinister than they are.
The real impact on public perception is likely to be cumulative rather than immediate. The Supreme Court has long depended on a kind of institutional mystique—an image of deliberation, neutrality, and distance from politics. The more its most consequential decisions appear to come from expedited, opaque processes, the harder it becomes to sustain that image. And once that perception erodes, it doesn’t just affect how people view individual rulings—it shapes how they view the Court as an institution.
In that sense, the controversy over the shadow docket isn’t just about legal procedure. It’s about legitimacy, trust, and whether the Court is still seen as playing by a consistent set of rules. The memos, if interpreted the way the Times suggests, don’t just document a change—they symbolize it.
The debate sparked by the April 12, 2026 segment on Velshi reflects a familiar pattern in today’s political climate: two seemingly contradictory narratives hardening into opposing camps, each insisting the other must be false. On one side, supporters of President Trump point to improved enlistment numbers as evidence of renewed confidence in the military and a restoration of national pride. On the other, reporting from NPR—citing conversations with military retention specialists—describes a force grappling with declining morale, ethical unease, and an uptick in service members exploring ways to exit their commitments. What’s often lost in the back-and-forth is that both of these realities can coexist, and in fact, they frequently do.
#BREAKING: Velshi: “NPR reports that cracks are forming inside the military driven by low morale, ethical unease and a growing number of service members choosing to retire early, declining to re-enlist, or walking away from their contracts regardless of the consequences…The GI… pic.twitter.com/qRewE8WKVj
Enlistment and retention are not mirror images of one another. A surge in recruitment can happen at the same time that experienced personnel are choosing to leave. Economic conditions, patriotic sentiment, and targeted recruiting efforts can drive new enlistments upward, particularly among younger Americans seeking stability or opportunity. At the same time, those already inside the system—especially those with multiple years of service—may be responding to a completely different set of pressures. These include deployment fatigue, evolving mission objectives, and personal moral considerations shaped by real-world conflicts.
The war in Iran appears to be a central factor in this divergence. While new recruits may be motivated by a sense of duty or the promise of benefits, those already serving are confronting the realities of that conflict in real time. The reported spike in calls to the GI Rights Hotline, particularly from individuals asking about conscientious objection, suggests a level of internal strain that doesn’t necessarily show up in enlistment statistics. It points to a cohort of service members wrestling not just with physical risk, but with deeper questions about the purpose and justification of their involvement.
This is where the NPR reporting, controversial as it may be, aligns with a long historical pattern. Periods of active conflict often produce a split dynamic within the military: initial surges in enlistment followed by growing disillusionment among those directly engaged. The experience of war has a way of clarifying the gap between expectation and reality, and not everyone responds to that clarity in the same way. Some double down on their commitment, while others begin to look for an exit.
The Trump administration’s reported openness to discussing the possibility of a draft adds another layer to this picture. Even floating such an idea signals concern about the sustainability of current force levels. Governments do not typically raise the prospect of conscription unless they are worried about maintaining troop strength through voluntary means alone. In that context, improved enlistment numbers may not tell the full story; they may be masking underlying retention challenges that are harder to quantify but no less significant.
None of this necessarily invalidates the argument from Trump supporters that recruitment has improved. It likely has, and that improvement may reflect genuine enthusiasm among certain segments of the population. But it also doesn’t negate the accounts from retention specialists who are seeing an increase in early exits, non-reenlistment, and ethical concerns. These are different data points measuring different aspects of military health, and they can move in opposite directions at the same time.
What emerges, then, is a more complicated and more human portrait of the armed forces. It is a system absorbing new entrants even as it quietly loses some of its experienced core. It is a place where patriotism and doubt can exist side by side, sometimes within the same individual. And it is an institution shaped not just by policy decisions in Washington, but by the lived experiences of the people asked to carry them out.
Reducing this moment to a binary—either the military is strong and thriving, or it is fractured and faltering—misses the deeper truth. The reality is messier, layered, and far more revealing. A military can grow in numbers while simultaneously grappling with questions of morale and purpose. And acknowledging that complexity is not a sign of bias; it’s a recognition of how institutions, especially ones as consequential as the armed forces, actually function under pressure.
On April 9, 2026, Melania Trump issued a formal and notably direct statement on the official First Lady X account addressing renewed scrutiny over any past connection to Jeffrey Epstein. The statement appears designed to draw a firm boundary between herself and Epstein at a moment when old photos, social associations, and public curiosity continue to circulate online. In clear and unambiguous language, Melania asserted that she was never a friend of Epstein, did not maintain a social relationship with him, and had no meaningful interaction beyond incidental encounters that can occur in high-profile social environments.
Her argument rests heavily on distinction—between proximity and relationship, between being in the same room and having a personal connection. She emphasized that as a public figure, particularly during her years in New York and later as First Lady, she attended events where countless individuals were present, many of whom she neither knew personally nor interacted with beyond brief introductions. The underlying point of her statement is that photographs or overlapping appearances should not be misconstrued as evidence of friendship or endorsement. In that sense, her defense mirrors a broader argument often made by public figures who find themselves retroactively linked to controversial individuals: social orbit does not equal personal affiliation.
Melania’s statement also appears calibrated to separate her own record from that of her husband, Donald Trump, whose past acquaintance with Epstein has been publicly documented and discussed for years. While she did not directly reference her husband’s history, the subtext is hard to ignore. By drawing a personal line—“I was not his friend, nor did I socialize with him”—she implicitly narrows the scope of scrutiny to her own actions and experiences, rather than the broader Trump social and business network of the 1990s and early 2000s.
However, as with many statements of this nature, public evidence complicates the picture, even if it does not definitively contradict her claims. There are widely circulated photographs from the late 1990s and early 2000s showing Melania, then Melania Knauss, in the same settings as Epstein and other high-profile figures. Some of these images were taken at events hosted at Mar-a-Lago or New York social gatherings where Epstein was also present. Critics argue that these images suggest at least a degree of familiarity within overlapping elite circles. Supporters counter that such images are precisely the kind of incidental proximity Melania referenced—snapshots of crowded events rather than proof of a sustained or personal relationship.
There is also the broader context of Epstein’s well-documented integration into elite social networks during that era. He moved easily among business leaders, politicians, and celebrities, often attending the same parties and functions. For many individuals, the question is not whether they ever encountered Epstein—it is whether those encounters rose to the level of friendship, collaboration, or awareness of his criminal behavior. Melania’s statement leans heavily on this distinction, asserting that whatever overlap existed never translated into a personal bond or ongoing association.
Importantly, there has been no widely accepted public evidence placing Melania Trump in Epstein’s inner circle, nor has she been accused of wrongdoing related to his activities. The tension instead lies in perception: how the public interprets proximity, imagery, and the blurred lines of high-society interactions. In the age of social media, where a single photograph can take on outsized significance, her statement seems aimed at preemptively reframing that narrative.
What makes this moment notable is not just the denial itself, but the fact that it was delivered through an official First Lady channel, lending it a level of formality and weight beyond a casual response or spokesperson comment. That choice suggests an awareness that the issue, however indirect, carries reputational stakes that extend beyond political cycles and into historical record.
In the end, Melania Trump’s statement is less about introducing new facts and more about asserting a clear interpretation of existing ones. She is asking the public to accept a narrower definition of association—one that distinguishes sharply between being present in the same elite social universe as Jeffrey Epstein and being personally connected to him. Whether that distinction satisfies skeptics will likely depend less on new evidence and more on how individuals interpret the ambiguous space between coincidence and connection.
When Elise Jordan pointed out that J.D. Vance is expected to travel to Hungary to campaign on behalf of Viktor Orbán, she highlighted something that feels deeply out of step with longstanding American political tradition. It is not merely unusual—it is almost without precedent—for a sitting U.S. vice president to actively campaign for a foreign leader, particularly one widely characterized as an authoritarian-leaning figure with close ties to Vladimir Putin. The optics alone raise serious questions about priorities, alliances, and the broader message being sent about the United States’ role in the world.
#BREAKING: 🔥Elise: “…it’s not everyday you see the sitting vice president campaign for a foreign authoritarian leader, but that’s what going to happen this Tuesday when @JDVance heads to Hungary to campaign for Viktor Orban…”🤦♀️ pic.twitter.com/Miy8PlqOYq
At its core, the vice presidency is an office rooted in representing American interests—domestically and abroad. When U.S. officials travel internationally, it is typically to strengthen diplomatic ties, negotiate agreements, or reinforce shared democratic values. Campaigning for a foreign political figure crosses into a different realm entirely. It blurs the line between diplomacy and political endorsement in a way that risks undermining the principle of national sovereignty—a principle the United States has historically emphasized in its foreign policy rhetoric. If it is inappropriate for foreign leaders to interfere in American elections, the inverse should raise equal concern.
What makes this situation even more striking is the nature of Orbán’s governance. His tenure in Hungary has been marked by repeated clashes with the European Union over democratic backsliding, restrictions on press freedom, and consolidation of power. While supporters argue he represents a model of nationalist governance, critics view his leadership as emblematic of the erosion of liberal democratic norms. For a sitting U.S. vice president to lend political support—symbolically or otherwise—to such a figure risks signaling a departure from America’s traditional role as a global advocate for democratic institutions and practices.
There is also a strategic dimension that cannot be ignored. Orbán’s perceived alignment with Putin complicates matters further, especially given ongoing tensions between the United States and Russia. Even if the intent of the trip is framed as ideological alignment or coalition-building among like-minded political movements, the broader geopolitical context makes the move difficult to separate from implications about U.S. foreign policy posture. Allies may question whether Washington is shifting its stance, while adversaries may interpret the gesture as a sign of division or inconsistency.
Defenders of the trip might argue that in an increasingly interconnected political landscape, ideological alliances transcend borders, and leaders have a right to engage with counterparts who share their worldview. They may also point out that American politicians frequently attend international conferences or speak at global forums hosted by foreign leaders. But there is a meaningful distinction between participating in dialogue and actively campaigning for someone seeking or maintaining power in another country. The latter carries a level of endorsement that goes beyond mere engagement—it is political intervention in spirit, if not in law.
Ultimately, the unease surrounding this development stems from a broader concern about precedent. If it becomes normalized for high-ranking U.S. officials to campaign for foreign leaders, it opens the door to a new kind of political entanglement—one where domestic politics and international power struggles become increasingly intertwined. That is a shift that could erode trust, both at home and abroad, in the impartiality and integrity of American leadership.
Jordan’s observation captures more than just a surprising headline—it underscores a moment that forces a reconsideration of what is expected from those who hold the highest offices in the United States. Whether one views the trip as strategic outreach or a troubling deviation, it undeniably challenges the norms that have long defined the boundaries between American governance and global political influence.
What Ali Velshi is getting at goes beyond a simple policy disagreement—it’s a clash over whether the meaning of citizenship in the United States is fixed by the Constitution or open to reinterpretation by political power. His framing roots the debate where it actually belongs: in the historical rupture created by the Fourteenth Amendment after one of the darkest chapters in American legal history, the Dred Scott decision. That ruling didn’t just deny citizenship to Black Americans; it asserted that an entire class of people could be permanently excluded from the political community, regardless of birthplace. The 14th Amendment was designed as a direct, unequivocal rejection of that idea. It didn’t leave room for ambiguity or shifting political winds—it established a constitutional baseline: if you are born on American soil and subject to its laws, you are a citizen.
Velshi’s argument is powerful because it highlights that this wasn’t just a legal tweak; it was a structural safeguard. Before the amendment, states—and by extension, political actors—could decide who counted and who didn’t. That meant citizenship could expand or contract based on prejudice, economics, or political expediency. The framers of the 14th Amendment deliberately removed that discretion. By constitutionalizing birthright citizenship, they created a bright-line rule that would prevent future generations from relitigating who belongs. In that sense, the amendment is not just about inclusion; it’s about stability. It ensures that citizenship is not something that can be negotiated away or narrowed through executive action or shifting interpretations.
From this perspective, any attempt by the Trump administration to end or limit birthright citizenship through executive action runs directly into that constitutional wall. Velshi’s point that the amendment placed citizenship “beyond the reach” of presidents is not rhetorical flourish—it reflects a core principle of constitutional law: the executive branch cannot override a constitutional guarantee. The language of the amendment—“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens”—has long been understood, including by the Supreme Court, to apply broadly. The landmark 1898 case United States v. Wong Kim Ark reinforced that interpretation, affirming that birth on U.S. soil confers citizenship regardless of parental nationality, with narrow exceptions like children of diplomats. Velshi’s argument aligns with over a century of legal precedent and constitutional understanding.
At the same time, to fully grapple with the issue, it’s important to acknowledge the counterarguments that supporters of former President Donald Trump might raise. Their central claim often hinges on the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” They argue that this language was never intended to include everyone born on U.S. soil, particularly children of individuals who are in the country unlawfully. In their view, being “subject to the jurisdiction” implies a more complete political allegiance than mere physical presence. They may point to historical debates suggesting that the amendment’s framers were primarily concerned with formerly enslaved people and not modern questions of immigration, and they argue that the current interpretation stretches the original intent beyond recognition.
Additionally, Trump administration defenders might frame the issue less as a constitutional rollback and more as a policy correction. They could argue that birthright citizenship, as currently applied, creates incentives for unauthorized immigration and “birth tourism,” and that reinterpreting the amendment is necessary to align citizenship with contemporary realities. From this standpoint, they may claim that courts have not fully revisited the scope of the 14th Amendment in light of modern immigration systems, leaving room for executive or legislative clarification.
Still, these counterarguments face significant hurdles. The historical record, while complex, largely supports a broad understanding of birthright citizenship, and Supreme Court precedent has consistently reinforced that view. More importantly, Velshi’s underlying point remains difficult to escape: the 14th Amendment was designed precisely to prevent the kind of selective inclusion that these arguments could enable. Once citizenship becomes contingent—on parental status, legal technicalities, or shifting interpretations—it risks returning to a system where belonging is conditional rather than guaranteed.
In the end, the debate is not just about immigration policy; it’s about whether the Constitution sets firm boundaries that protect fundamental rights or whether those boundaries can be reinterpreted by those in power. Velshi’s argument insists that the line drawn by the 14th Amendment is intentional, durable, and essential to the American identity. The counterarguments, while not without legal nuance, ultimately ask whether that line should be moved. And that is a question that goes to the heart of what the Constitution is meant to do: not merely reflect the will of the moment, but to restrain it.
